Charitable Corporations—Application of Workmen\u27s Compensation Acts by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 2 
January 1933 
Charitable Corporations—Application of Workmen's 
Compensation Acts 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charitable Corporations—Application of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 18 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 159 (1933). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss2/9 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Shiffler (D. C. M. D. Pa. 1902) 112 F. 505. As might be expected in view of
such a state of the decisions, the leading commentators upon the law of
bankruptcy were in direct conflict. Collier on Bankruptcy (12th ed.) p. 93
(it is not an act of bankruptcy); Remington, Elements of Bankruptcy Law
(3rd ed.) p. 16 (it is an act of bankruptcy). There is, of course, no difficulty
if there were creditors with provable claims at the time the conveyance was
made. Then, the creditor whose claim was contingent at the time of the
conveyance may join in the petition which forces the conveyor into bank-
ruptcy, provided the claim has been liquidated so as to be provable at the
time the petition is filed. In Re Van Horn (C. C. A. 2, 1917) 246 F. 822.
As the principal case points out, the word "include" is more frequently
used to introduce words which extend what would normally be the definition
of the class in question than to limit the extent of a class. In Re Harper
(D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1910) 175 F. 412 (which construed the word as used in a
later definition in the same section of the Bankruptcy Act with reference to
what were "debts"); Fraser v. Bentel (1911) 161 Cal. 390, 119 Pac. 509;
Wyatt v. City of Louisville (1924) 206 Ky. 432, 267 S. W. 146; Cooper V.
Stinson (1861) 5 Minn. 522. Such an interpretation is especially logical
under the peculiarities of wording of the definition section of the Bankruptcy
Act, where in some instances the narrow phrase "shall mean" is substituted
for "include".
The decision in the principal case is to be welcomed as settling a hitherto
disputed point in the interpretation of a statute, whose correct meaning is be-
coming increasingly important because of the prevailing economic condi-
tions. The decision would seem to accord with sound moral policy for there
is no more reason to allow a person with impunity to hinder, delay or defraud
a contingent creditor than there is to allow him to do so towards a creditor
who at the time holds a provable claim. Indeed, the contingent creditor is so
placed that he is in need of the fullest protection, since he cannot take steps
to attach the property or otherwise prevent the conveyance, remedies which
are possessed by a creditor with a provable claim. G. W. S., '33.
CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS--APPLICATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AcTs.-The plaintiff was injured while working as a paid employee of a
charitable corporation. The Workmen's Compensation Commission allowed
a claim for the compensation fixed by the Statute. The corporation resisted
payment on the ground that the Act did not apply to charitable corporations.
It was held that the Act applies to charitable corporations. Hope v. Barnes
Hospital (Mo. App. 1932) 55 S. W. (2d) 319.
There should be little hesitation in applying a Workmen's Compensation
Act to charitable corporations in the minority of states which hold such cor-
porations fully liable for torts committed by their agents or servants. How-
ever, in most states it has become a settled rule of law that a charitable
corporation is not liable to the beneficiaries of the charity for torts done to
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them, because such liability would tend to divert the funds of the charity from
the purpose for which they were intrusted to it. In such states there is a
sharp conflict in the authorities as to whether a charity can be liable to its
employees at common law. Several states impose such a liability on the
ground that the duty which a master owes his servant is an absolute, non-
delegable duty imposed by law on all alike. Mclnery v. St. Luke's Hospital
Ass'n (1913) 122 Minn. 10, 141 N. W. 837; Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church
(1928) 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. W. 463; Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid Ass'n
(1906) 73 N. H. 556, 64 Atl. 190; Armandez v. Hotel Dieu (Tex. Civ. App.
1912) 145 S. W. 1030, aff'd (Tex. Com. of App. 1919) 210 S. W. 518, on the
basis of the opinion below as to this point. Other states reach the same re-
sult on a different basis. These say that a beneficiary cannot recover because
he must take the gift with the limitations imposed by the implied intent of
the donor that the money should not be diverted from charitable purposes.
However, an employee is not the recipient of such a bounty and hence is not
bound by such conditions. Bruce v. Central M.-E. Church (1907) 147 Mich.
230, 110 N. W. 951; Hodern v. Salvation Army (1910) 199 N. Y. 233, 92
N. E. 626; Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist Hospitals (1929) 197 N. C. 41,
147 S. E. 672. Still other cases impose such a liability but do so in such vague
language that it is impossible to tell what basis is used. Old Folk's and
Orphan Children's Home v. Roberts (1930) 91 Ind. App. 533, 171 N. E. 10;
Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius (1930) 123 Oh. St. 52, 173 N. E. 737. There
are, however, a considerable number of states which consider that the reason
why a beneficiary cannot recover is essentially one of public policy, i. e. that
the public as a whole are interested that charitable funds should not be di-
verted to non-charitable uses, and that °hence neither a beneficiary nor an
employee can recover. Eads v. Young Woman's Christian Ass'n (1930) 325
Mo. 577, 29 S. W. (2d) 701; Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hospital (1909) 137 Mo.
App. 116, 117 S. W. 1189; Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n (1921) 193 Ky.
400, 236, S. W. 757; Farrigan v. Pevear (1906) 193 Mass. 147, 78 N. E.
855; and cf. O'Neill v. Odd Fellows Home (1918) 89 Or. 382, 174 Pac. 148,
where the exemption- was incorporated into the special statute creating the
corporation.
There have been few cases dealing with the specific question covered by
this Missouri case. In a recent Tennessee case the Statute was held ap-
plicable, but the decision was placed on the ground that the charitable cor-
poration would have been liable at common law and the Statute merely
changed the remedy. Lincoln Memorial University v. Sutton (1931) 163
Tenn. 298, 43 S. W. (2d) 193. A Michigan decision likewise assumes that
the Act would apply, the case going off on the point that a novice in a Catholic
nursing order was not an employee within the meaning of the Statute. Blust
v. Sisters of Mercy (1931) 256 Mich. 1, 239 N. W. 401 (but in Michigan the
charitable corporation would be liable for torts to employees at common law,
Bruce v. Central M.-E. Church, supra). Construing a Massachusetts Statute
which applied to "every person in the service of another under any contract
of hire" (with certain exceptions, none of which could conceivably apply to
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charitable corporations), the Massachusetts Supreme Court reached the con-
clusion that the legislature could not have intended to abolish by implication
the common law defense of a charitable corporation, applying the canon of
statutory construction that statutes in derogation of the common law are
to be strictly construed. Zoulalian v. New England Sanitorium & Benevolent
Ass'n (1918) 230 Mass. 102, 119 N. E. 686. A similar result was reached in
New York, but here the decision was based on the fact that the employments
covered were limited to employments "in a trade, business, or occupation
carried on by the employer for pecuniary gain". Dillon v. St. Patrick
Cathedral (1922) 234 N. Y. 225, 137 N. E. 311. The sequel of this case is
interesting. In the same year it was held that where the charitable cor-
poration carried insurance, the insurer could not invoke the immunity of the
charity. Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital (1923) 236 N. Y. 268, 140 N. E.
694. In 1929 the Statute was amended so as to extend it to any person, firm,
or corporation employing four or more persons. N. Y. Laws (1929) ch. 304;
C. S. N. Y. (Cahill 1930) ch. 66 sec. 3 (18). This extension is logical in New
York where the charitable corporation would be liable at common law to a
servant.
The words of the Missouri Statute interpreted literally are broad enough
to include charitable corporations, for employer is defined to include every
"corporation". However, 1he second subdivision of the same section shows
that this term is not to be taken literally, for "municipal corporations" are
only included if the body elects to accept the chapter by law or ordinance.
R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3304. The Statute expressly provides that it shall be
conclusively presumed to apply to all employers who do not elect to reject it,
by filing a notice with the commission (which must also be posted at the
plant). R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3300. The whole theory of this election seems
to be that it is an election between liability under the Statute or liability at
common law. It would hardly seem that such an elective liability could be
meant to destroy an absolute defense, which would have prevented there being
any liability at all. Rules which are based on public policy should not be
changed by such shadowy implications. Of course, charitable corporations
can avoid all future trouble by promptly filing the notice of election with the
commission. G. W. S., '33.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAw-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-The
defendant negroes were convicted in Alabama of the crime of rape upon two
white girls. They were not given an opportunity before trial to communicate
with relatives and friend to attempt to secure counsel. At the time they were
arraigned, the trial judge stated he appointed all the members of the local
bar as their counsel, but did not designate any particular attorney to aid the
defendants until the case was actually called for trial. The result was that
the counsel finally assigned was unprepared to defend the case and the de-
fendants were deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. From a de-
cision of the Alabama Supreme Court affirming the conviction, certiorari
Washington University Open Scholarship
